This week, Chandana Seshadri joins the podcast to discuss her RUSI Journal article, “How DPRK IT Workers Exploit Identity Management Vulnerabilities,” which documents how North Korean workers slip through remote-hiring systems to earn hard currency and open doors for bigger cyber operations.
The researcher highlights the case of Christina Chapman — a U.S. citizen who helped DPRK workers get remote jobs through “laptop farms” — as a key example of how ordinary employment channels can be manipulated for sanctions evasion. She also explains how the rapid shift to remote work after COVID-19 opened new vulnerabilities for infiltration, as companies often skip in-person verification and identity checks.
Seshadri calls for international working groups to share best practices and red flags while respecting privacy laws, while stressing the issue is not only relevant to cybersecurity but also national security and sanctions enforcement.
Chandana Seshadri is a non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center’s 38 North and former research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), specializing in the intersection of sanctions, financial crime and cyber threats with a focus on North Korea.
About the podcast: The North Korea News Podcast is a weekly podcast hosted by Jacco Zwetsloot exclusively for NK News, covering all things DPRK — from news to extended interviews with leading experts and analysts in the field, along with insight from our very own journalists.
NK News subscribers can listen to this and other exclusive episodes from their preferred podcast player by accessing the private podcast feed. For more detailed instructions, please see the step-by-step guide at nknews.org/private-feed.
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 14:08 — 12.0MB) | Embed
This week, Chandana Seshadri joins the podcast to discuss her RUSI Journal article, “How DPRK IT Workers Exploit Identity Management Vulnerabilities,” which documents how North Korean workers slip through remote-hiring systems to earn hard currency and open doors for bigger cyber operations.
The researcher highlights the case of Christina Chapman — a U.S. citizen who helped DPRK workers get remote jobs through “laptop farms” — as a key example of how ordinary employment channels can be manipulated for sanctions evasion. She also explains how the rapid shift to remote work after COVID-19 opened new vulnerabilities for infiltration, as companies often skip in-person verification and identity checks.
Leave a Reply