Through the lens of Mao Zedong’s protracted people’s war, this moment looks less like capitulation and more like the first stage of a longer campaign: strategic defensive. Mao’s theory of protracted war, which took shape during the second Sino-Japanese war, was a method of going from a position of weakness to eventual strength. The opening stage emphasised avoiding decisive battles, conserving resources and repositioning the political terrain to outlast a stronger adversary.

China has long worn the “developing country” badge at the WTO, a status that entitles members to special and differential treatment. These benefits include more extended implementation periods for trade commitments and, in some cases, exemptions from certain obligations.

In practice, China has already conceded some privileges. What it has done is use the label to align itself with the Global South. By claiming to be a developing country, Beijing has positioned itself as a peer and advocate of states that genuinely rely on special and differential treatment to protect fragile economies.

But in the realm of global trade politics, perceptions matter as much as material advantages. The United States and European Union have highlighted the supposed inconsistency of a hi-tech export powerhouse that still seeks the same benefits as far poorer states. US administrations under both Donald Trump and Joe Biden have chastised Beijing over the matter.

By giving up special and differential treatment benefits, China has executed a tactical retreat. It has removed one of Washington’s most effective talking points while conceding very little of substance. This is precisely the kind of manoeuvre Mao envisioned in strategic defence: avoid a direct clash you cannot win, yield ground where the loss is minimal and reframe the battlefield in terms that favour your long-term position.